El respeto y sus bases sociales
Palabras clave:
respeto propio, respeto mutuo, bienes primarios, ethos igualitarioResumen
Para la teoría rawlsiana, no hay nada más importante que la distribución de las bases sociales del respeto propio. Sin embargo, la falta de claridad con respecto a qué debemos considerar como respeto propio y cuáles son sus bases sociales es fuente de continua
insatisfacción entre rawlsianos y críticos. Igualmente importante y subdesarrollada es la noción de respeto mutuo –aunque erróneamente se le ha conferido menor atención en la literatura. En este texto me propongo ofrecer una caracterización de estas tres nociones: el respeto propio, el mutuo y sus bases sociales. Sostendré que sólo con las caracterizaciones ofrecidas la teoría en cuestión tiene las herramientas para mostrar que el ideal de sociedad justa que plantea excluye formas de discriminación (de racismo, clasismo, machismo o hetero-normativismo), aunque no violatorias de derechos, en el domino de interacción personal.
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