Respect and its social bases
Keywords:
self-respect, mutual respect, primary goods, egalitarian ethosAbstract
For Rawlsian theory, nothing is more important than the distribution of the social bases of self-respect. However, the lack of clarity with regards to what precisely is self-respect and what are its social bases is a source of constant dissatisfaction among Rawlsians and Rawlsian critics alike. The Rawlsian notion of mutual respect is also underdeveloped –although it has not generated as much attraction in the literature as it should. In this paper I provide a
characterization of those three notions: self-respect, mutual respect, and their social bases. I will argue that only by adopting these characterizations Rawls’s theory can show that the ideal of a just society it portraits excludes forms of discrimination at the personal domain of interaction which do not violate basic rights and liberties.
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