Comments on “Risk-centered ordinal consequentialism”

Abstract

In this discussion note, I analyze several aspects of Mariano Garreta Leclercq’s “Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism”. I highlight its valuable contribution in identifying risk as a distinct, third dimension of political disagreement that persists even when disagreements about facts and values are resolved. However, I present five key critiques regarding the practical application of democratic risk aggregation. First, widespread voter ignorance and tribal behavior suggest that expressed policy preferences often reflect factual misunderstandings rather than genuine risk attitudes. Second, the analogy comparing democracies to firms may be flawed because voters frequently reject expert consensus due to predictable biases rather than reasonable variations in risk tolerance. Third, the paper relies on an idealized view of political institutions, underestimating the influence of concentrated interest groups and rationally ignorant voters. Fourth, the complexity of public policy creates a knowledge problem that might be better addressed by expanding exit options, such as "foot voting" and decentralization. Finally, I argue that if there is no objectively correct risk attitude, majoritarian decision-making is just as dominating as expert rule. This suggests that reducing the scope of collective decision-making is a more appropriate conclusion than defending mass democratic aggregation.