Reasons as a robust normative concept in Raz and the problems of his metaethical realism.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36446/rlfp183Keywords:
Agency, Metaethical constructivism, Normativity, Reasons, Laws point of view, Joseph RazAbstract
This article addresses the central problem of the theory of reasons in Raz. I try to show that the concept of reason and agency cia are key concepts for the explanation of the normativity of the right and that Raz achieved, through his emphasis on the concept of reasons, successfully explain the regulations of the right to work. vis-à-vis the notion of legitimate authority. The introduction of reasons different level was a very promising path to explore a legal point of view that would contribute to breaking the decisional impasse of moral disagreements. However, his metaethical realism and consideration of reasons as moral facts, even special ones, disadvantaged to account for the special way in which reasons count for an agent, which impacted his theory of the rules and the impossibility of taking development even further of the explanation of the possible specificity of the point of view of the right.Downloads
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