Constitutional review: ex-ante and ex-post.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36446/rlfp157Keywords:
Constitutional Review, Democracy, Majoritary RuleAbstract
I distinguish the types of institutional arrangements designed to assure the compatibility of laws with constitutions. Then I review their respective merits and demerits. My conclusion is that relying exclusively on ex-ante review does not generate any of the disasters conjured by the advocates of “liberal democracy” and it has the merit of attenuating the conflict between majority rule and constitutionalism, democracy and “the rule of law”.
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