Democracia deliberativa y el problema de los comunes
Palabras clave:
deliberative democracy, common-pool resources, Ostrom, tragedy of the commonsResumen
A partir del artículo de Hardin “La tragedia de los comunes”, se ha sostenido tradicionalmente que los gobiernos deben administrar los bienes públicos pues una administración privada llevaría a su agotamiento. No obstante, Elinor Ostrom ha desafiado esta interpretación al identificar un tipo específico de recursos llamado “common-pool” que, bajo ciertas circunstancias de confianza y comunicación fluida entre las partes involucradas, puede ser eficientemente administrada por grupos de individuos. En este contexto, este artículo sostiene que los postulados de la democracia deliberativa son compatibles con una administración eficiente de los recursos “common-pool”. Este resultado contradeciría la literatura que los gobiernos autocráticos son más efectivos en la administración de los recursos naturales.
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