Consecuencialismo ordinal centrado en el riesgo
Una defensa de la democracia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36446/rlfp172Palabras clave:
Riesgo, Democracia contestataria, Epistocracia, Consecuencialismo, Utilidad Ordinal esperada, ParcialidadResumen
¿Por qué deberíamos valorar las instituciones democráticas
desde un punto de vista instrumental? ¿Qué contribución hace el número, la ampliación de la cantidad de individuos cuyas preferen?cias son satisfechas, a la calidad de las decisiones tomadas a través de esa estrategia? ¿Deberían las decisiones políticas ser dejadas en manos de expertos en lugar de aspirar a que las mayorías tengan
una influencia decisiva?
Supongamos que dejamos de lado los valores igualitarios inhe?rentes a las instituciones democráticas y su supuesto potencial epis?témico. Nuestra hipótesis es que la creciente satisfacción de las pre?ferencias libres e informadas de los afectados —ya sea generando el mayor consenso posible en torno a las decisiones impuestas a todos o creando espacios de desregulación parcial— contribuye a la calidad
de las decisiones, ya que las decisiones políticas relevantes se toman invariablemente en contextos de riesgo. El riesgo es el puente no epistémico entre la cantidad de individuos que apoyan una decisión y la calidad del resultado esperado. En contextos caracterizados por una probabilidad significativa de error y un alto costo del error para el bienestar individual, la toma de decisiones debe llevarse a cabo mediante un sistema abierto y perpetuamente revisable que combi?ne la regla de la mayoría con la posibilidad efectiva de impugnación
tanto a nivel individual como colectivo. Este enfoque debe tratar de acomodar gradualmente las preferencias individuales. En lugar de justificar exclusivamente las decisiones gubernamentales sobre la base de que son las opciones “correctas” o las que tomaría un agente
que conociera la verdad, el objetivo del sistema debe ser permanecer sensible a la gama de ganancias deseables y pérdidas tolerables de los bienes en juego para cada individuo afectado, dada su situación
específica. El problema no es la falibilidad de los agentes –cometer errores en el plano fáctico o normativo– sino exponer a los afectados a niveles de riesgo incompatibles con la sostenibilidad de sus proyectos.
Nos proponemos ofrecer una justificación instrumental, no epis?témica de una concepción republicana de la democracia. Con este fin, hemos elaborado un nuevo tipo de teoría normativa consecuencialista, que denominamos consecuencialismo ordinal centrado en el
riesgo. Esta concepción pretende dar cuenta de los aspectos definitorios de la normatividad política. En este nuevo tipo de consecuencialismo, el criterio de corrección, sin renunciar a la búsqueda de razones objetivas e imparciales como parte del proceso, es el grado
en que las decisiones se acercan a los polos opuestos del consenso libre e informado y la desregulación sin dominación interpersonal. En una democracia republicana, la maximización del bien esperado —o utilidad— y de la libertad como no dominación son extensional?mente equivalentes.
Descargas
Citas
Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2007. Democracy for Realists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2006. “The Epistemology of Democracy.” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1-2): 8–22.
Arendt, Hannah. 1977. “Truth and Politics.” In Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, 227–64. New York: Penguin.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951. “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations.” Econometrica 19 (4): 404–37.
Arrow, Kenneth J.1953. “The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing.” Review of Economic Studies 31: 91–96.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Helsinki: Yrjö Jahnssoninsäätiö.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1970. Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1973. “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice.” The Journal of Philosophy 70: 245–63.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1996. “The Theory of Risk-Bearing: Small and Great Risks.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 12: 103–11.
Bartels, Larry. 1996. “Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 40: 194–230.
Beiner, Ronald. 2008. “Rereading ‘Truth and Politics’.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 34 (1-2): 123–36.
Bell, Daniel A. 2015. The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bernoulli, Daniel. 1738. “Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis.” Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae 5: 175–92.
Bernoulli, Daniel. 1954. “Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk.” Translated by Louise Sommer. Econometrica 22 (1): 23–36.
Brennan, Jason. 2016. Against Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brennan, Jason. 2017. “Does the Demographic Objection to Epistocracy Succeed?” Res Publica 24 (1): 53–71.
Brennan, Jason, and Hélène Landemore. 2022. Debating Democracy: Do We Need More or Less? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buchak, Lara. 2014. Risk and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. . 2017. “Taking Risks behind the Veil of Ignorance.” Ethics 127: 610–44.
Buchak, Lara. 2022. “Relative Priority.” Economics & Philosophy(2022): 1–31.
Bykvist, Krister. 2014. “Utilitarianism in the Twentieth Century.” In The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, edited by Ben Eggleston and Dale Miller, 103–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cohen, Joshua. 1986. “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy.” Ethics 97 (1): 26–38.
Cohen, Joshua. 1989. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, edited by Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, 17–34. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Cohen, Joshua. 2009. “Truth and Public Reason.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 (1): 2–42.
Cohen, Joshua. 2010. The Arc of the Moral Universe and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Coleman, Jules, and John Ferejohn. 1986. “Democracy and Social Choice.” Ethics 97: 6–25.
Condorcet, Marquis de. 1995. “An Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Decisions Rendered by a Plurality of Votes.” In Classics of Social Choice, edited and translated by Iain McLean and Arnold B. Urken, 91–112. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Elster, Jon, and John Roemer, eds. 1991. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Forst, Rainer. 2013. “A Kantian Republican Conception of Justice as Nondomination.” In Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law, and Politics, edited by Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Friedman, Milton, and Leonard J. Savage. 1948. “The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk.” The Journal of Political Economy 56 (4): 279–304.
Gaus, Gerald. 1997. “Does Democracy Reveal the Voice of the People? Four Takes on Rousseau.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2): 141–62.
Gibbons, Anthony. 2021. “Political Disagreement and Minimal Epistocracy.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19: 192–201. Goodin, Robert E., and Kai Spiekermann. 2018. An Epistemic Theory of Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grofman, Bernard, and Scott Feld. 1988. “Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective.” American Political Science Review 82 (2): 567–76.
Guerrero, Alexander A. 2014. “Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42: 135–78.
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Harsanyi, John C. 1955. “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.” Journal of Political Economy 6 (3): 309–21.
Harsanyi, John C. 1975. “Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions.” Theory and Decision 6: 311–32. . 1977. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harsanyi, John C. 1979. “Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.” Theory and Decision11: 289–317.
Harsanyi, John C. 1982. “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior.” In Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, 39–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hayek, F. A. von. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35: 519–30.
Hayek, F. A. von. 1955. The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
Holtug, Nils. 2006. “Prioritarianism.” In Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality, edited by Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, 125–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hong, Lu, and Scott E. Page. 2004. “Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences101: 16385–89.
Jackson, Frank. 1991. “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection.” Ethics 101 (3): 461–82. Jones, Geoff. 2020. 10% Less Democracy: Why You Should Trust Elites a Little More and the Masses a Little Less. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica47: 263–91.
Lafont, Cristina. 2020. Democracy without Shortcuts: A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Landemore, Hélène. 2012. “Democratic Reason: The Mechanisms of Collective Intelligence in Politics.” In Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms, edited by Hélène Landemore and Jon Elster, 151–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Landemore, Hélène. 2013. Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Landemore, Hélène. 2017. “Beyond the Fact of Disagreement? The Epistemic Turn in Deliberative Democracy.” Social Epistemology 31 (3): 277–95.
Lavoie, Don. 1986. “The Market as a Procedure for Discovery and Conveyance of Inarticulate Knowledge.” Comparative Economic Studies 28: 1–19.
List, Christian. 2001. “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem.” Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3): 277–306.
López-Guerra, Claudio. 2014. Democracy and Disenfran-chisement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Machina, Mark J. 1982. “‘Expected Utility’ Analysis without the Independence Axiom.” Econometrica 50: 277–323.
Malcolm, Finn. 2022. “Epistocracy and Public Interests.” Res Publica 28: 173–92.
Martí, José Luis. 2006. “The Epistemic Conception of Deliberative Democracy Defended.” In Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents: National and Post-national Challenges, edited by Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí, 27–56. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Mason, Elinor. 2014. “Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Prospectivism.” In The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, edited by Ben Eggleston and Dale Miller, 177–98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maynor, John W. 2003. Republicanism in the Modern World. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Menger, Karl. 1967. “The Role of Uncertainty in Economics.” Translated by W. Schoellkopf and W. G. Mellon. In Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, edited by Martin Shubik, 211–31. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mill, John Stuart. 1991. Considerations on Representative Government. New York: Prometheus Books. Originally published in 1861 by Parker, Son, and Bourn.
Mulligan, Thomas. 2018. “Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century.” The Philosophical Quarterly 68: 286–306.
Narens, Louis, and Brian Skyrms. 2020. The Pursuit of Happiness: Philosophical and Psychological Foundations of Utility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nino, Carlos S. 1996. The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Okasha, Samir. 2007. “Rational Choice, Risk Aversion, and Evolution.” The Journal of Philosophy 104 (5): 217–35.
Okasha, Samir. 2011. “Optimal Choice in the Face of Risk: Decision Theory Meets Evolution.” Philosophy of Science 78 (1): 83–104. Parfit, Derek. 1991. Equality or Priority? The Lindley Lecture. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas.
Parfit, Derek. 1997. “Equality and Priority.” Ratio 10: 202–21. . 2011. On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 1999. “Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization.” In Democracy’s Edges, edited by Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, 163–190. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2001. A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2012a. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2012b. “The Inescapability of Consequentialism.” In Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, edited by Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang, 41–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, Philip. 2014. Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. . 2015. “On the People’s Terms: A Reply to Four Critiques.” Symposium: Republicanism between Justice and Democracy. Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series) 5 (2): 79–97.
Pettit, Philip. 2019. “The General Will, the Common Good, and a Democracy of Standards.” In Republicanism and the Future of Democracy, edited by Yiftah Elazar and Geneviève Rousselière, 13–49. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Quiggin, John. 1982. “A Theory of Anticipated Utility.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 323–43.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Riley, Jonathan. 1990. “Utilitarian Ethics and Democratic Government.” Ethics 100: 335–48.
Roemer, John E. 1996. Theories of Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1977. “St. Petersburg Paradoxes: Defanged, Dissected, and Historically Described.” Journal of Economic Literature 15 (1): 24–55.
Schamberger, Christopher. 2023. “The Metaethical Dilemma of Epistemic Democracy.” Economics & Philosophy 39: 1–19. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper.
Sen, Amartya. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Amsterdam: North Holland. . 1979. “Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare.” In Economics and Human Welfare, edited by Michael J. Boskin, 183–201. New York: Academic Press. Sen, Amartya, and Bernard Williams, eds. 1982. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shaw, William H. 1999. Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Somin, Ilya. 2013. The Problem of Political Ignorance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Spector, Horacio. 2016. “Decisional Nonconsequentialism and the Risk Sensitivity of Obligation.” Social Philosophy and Policy 32 (2): 91–128.
Urbinati, Nadia. 2014. Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Weymark, John. 1991. “A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism.” In Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, edited by Jon Elster and John Roemer, 255–320. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Bernard. 2005. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Woodard, Christopher. 2019. Taking Utilitarianism Seriously. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Yaari, Menahem E. 1987. “The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk.” Econometrica 55: 95–115.
Descargas
Publicado
Cómo citar
Número
Sección
Licencia
Derechos de autor 2026 Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía Política
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
