An objection to Garreta Leclercq
- At 17 September, 2013
- By admin
- In Articles
AN OBJECTION TO GARRETA LECLERQ’S “DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: TWO MODELS OF PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION”
[Una objeción a “Democracia y deliberación: dos modelos de justificación pública”, de Garreta Leclercq]
Ezequiel Spector
Di Tella University
espector@utdt.edu
Escuela de Derecho, Av. Figueroa Alcorta 7350, C1428BCW, CABA, Argentina
ABSTRACT
In “Democracy and Deliberation: Two Models of Public Justification”, Mariano Garreta Leclercq presents an interesting argument in favor of what he calls “the common ground” conception of justification, as against the “standard” conception of justification. In this note I present an objection to that argument. More precisely, I point out a tension between two statements of that argument: 1) There is no right to decide for others; and 2) the margin of error in moral issues is very considerable. I say that, if we are committed to the statement that the margin of error is very considerable in moral issues, so we cannot be convinced that there is no right to decide for others, because it is a moral principle in itself.
Key words: Public justification – Standard conception of justification – Common ground conception of justification – Democracy – Public debate
