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**FOR THE PEOPLE: A REPUBLICAN STAND
ON INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION**

María Victoria Kristan

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MARÍA VICTORIA KRISTAN

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Partizanska cesta 6, Kranj, Slovenija, UE.

victoria.kristan@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

International interventions have traditionally been justified on the basis of (alleged) human rights violations, insofar as these strike us as intolerably unjust. In this paper I will argue that there are compelling reasons for the international community to consider political legitimacy as an additional value to be protected. I offer three independent arguments in favour of my claim. The first two arguments dwell on the relationship between democracy and human rights. The third aims to show that political legitimacy has logical and normative priority over justice. From this priority it follows that international interventions should be made with the aim of ensuring political legitimacy.

Keywords: democracy - legitimacy - human rights - non-domination - international intervention.

RESUMEN

Las intervenciones internacionales han sido tradicionalmente justificadas sobre la base de (supuestas) violaciones de derechos humanos, en la medida en que nos resulten intolerablemente injustas. En este artículo argumentaré que hay razones de peso para que la comunidad internacional considere a la legitimidad política como un valor adicional a proteger. Para ello ofreceré tres argumentos independientes a favor de mi posición. Los primeros dos argumentos

se centran en la relación entre democracia y derechos humanos. El tercero apunta a demostrar que la legitimidad política tiene prioridad lógica y normativa sobre la justicia. De esta prioridad se deduce que las intervenciones internacionales deben ser llevadas a cabo con el objetivo de garantizar la legitimidad política.

Palabras clave: democracia - legitimidad - derechos humanos - no dominación - intervención internacional.

I. Introduction

Apart from a serious violation of human rights, there is no widespread agreement on what justifies an international intervention into some state or region in crisis. Many people support the view that the international community should restrain from intervening with the aim of ensuring political legitimacy. Others argue that human rights cannot be effectively protected if one remains agnostic as to the political legitimacy of the regimes in the affected states or regions. The objective of this paper is to defend the second position.

To defend this view, I make a threefold argument. The first part focuses on the relationship between democracy and human rights. I present two ways of showing that there is a human right to democracy. The recognition of this right leads one straightforwardly to the conclusion that issues of political legitimacy justify international intervention. Second, I point out that some human rights figure as conditions of political legitimacy regardless of one's view on whether there is a human right to democracy or not. This is important inasmuch as it leads to the conclusion that those international interventions that ensure political legitimacy necessarily shield the individuals from human rights violations, whereas other international interventions do not come with the same level of efficacy. In the last part of the paper, I tackle the conceptual and normative relationships between political

legitimacy and social justice. I offer the radical argument that a grave deficit of political legitimacy justifies international intervention even in the absence of current violations of human rights. This is because political legitimacy has both conceptual and normative priority over social justice. If any one of these arguments succeeds, all those who accept that some degree of social injustice justifies an intervention of the international community in a state or region in crisis should therefore also accept that such interventions be made in the aim of ensuring political legitimacy of the regimes in the affected states or regions.

II. A Human Right to Democracy?

As I have said above, it is common to justify international interventions based on the need to protect human rights. This is why I first present two republican arguments in favour of there being a human right to democracy. The acceptance of these arguments leads one directly to the conclusion that issues of political legitimacy justify international interventions.

One republican argument was made explicitly by Thomas Christiano (2011); although Christiano does not present himself as a republican, nothing substantial hinges on this. The other argument is implicit in Philip Pettit's (2012; 2014) work on the instrumental value of democracy. I will present them in the reverse order, but before I do, it is worth pointing out a third, alternative, connection between human rights and democracy.

Some charters of human rights — including those with the widest international consensus — consist of both a fairly wide range of political rights, which are generally considered essential for a political system to be democratic,¹ and a series

1. For example, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil

of other (non-political) rights, which are a technical necessity to enforce the former (for example, the rights of association, freedom of expression, and assembly).² In light of this fact,

and Political Rights states: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.”

2. Articles 19, 21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that: “Article 19. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (*ordre public*), or of public health or morals. Article 21. The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (*ordre public*), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 22. 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (*ordre public*), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right. 3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.”

one might conclude that we have a human right to democracy: this right exists because the exercise of political rights, as well as the exercise of the accessory rights, is possible only in a democratic system. Moreover, the exercise of civil and political rights also leads us (almost) necessarily to a democratic political system.³ Robert Dahl (2008: 48-49), for example, points out that some rights are necessary elements in democratic political institutions. He mentions the right to participate and the right to express ones' views on political matters (effective participation), the right to vote, and so on.

This explanation of the relationship between human rights and democracy is the most straightforward and obvious. It does not, however, serve the purpose of this paper because it does not reflect the importance of political legitimacy, unlike the following two republican arguments.

One of these two arguments, in favour of there being a human right to democracy, is arguably present in the work of Pettit (2014: 113 and 145), a chief exponent of the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination.⁴ Pettit has never pronounced himself as explicitly in favour of there being a human right to democracy. However, as I intend to show, such a right is implicit in his ideas on how to protect the individual from domination,⁵ especially public (or vertical)

3. For an account of human rights as a subset of universal moral rights and its relation to democracy, see Besson 2011.

4. He is not the only one. See also, Skinner (1998; 2010) and Lovett (2010), for example. Note, moreover, that for this paper, it is not important whether democracy is considered a human right or a necessary condition for the realisation of certain human rights, but not a human right in itself. I will abstract away from this issue in what follows.

5. Domination occupies a central place in political philosophy, especially in contemporary republicanism. Freedom as non-domination constitutes the core of this concept. Pettit (1997; 2001) conceptualizes freedom as the absence of domination. Domination involves the power of an intentional agent to interfere in a particular choice, either by removing one or more of the options, replacing one or more of these options, or misrepresenting one

domination. Indeed, Pettit argues that democracy, and only democracy, effectively protects the citizens of a state against domination by the government. In other words, he points out that democracy has an instrumental value inasmuch as it enables people to enjoy freedom as non-domination in relation to public powers. Democracy is thus considered a necessary condition of freedom as non-domination, given that only a democratic political regime enables people to be involved in the construction of the order within which they live, that is, by having ultimate control and the power of contestation over governmental policies.⁶ Only in a democratic political community can people enjoy an equal share in the process of creating the rules that guide their lives, constitute the basis of protection against domination, and provide the resources and rights to fight against social injustice (Pettit 2015b: 4 and 5).⁷

or more of the options (Pettit 2014: 42-43). Domination is also defined by reference to interference, although they are dissimilar. According to Pettit (2012: 50): “Someone A, will be dominated in a certain choice by another agent or agency, B, to the extent that B has a power of interfering in the choice that is not itself controlled by A”.

6. Contestation is understood as “the opportunity for members to challenge overtures both in advance of legislation and after they have been passed into law” (Pettit 2012: 215). Pettit also points out that a ‘contestatory citizenry’ is required in order to have a contestatory culture “that disposes people to resist any governmental abuse” or, in other words, “contest laws and policies that seem to undermine their equality or influence” (Pettit 2012: 225-226).

7. “The theory of political legitimacy holds that the laws and norms of the society should be imposed on you and others under a popular system of control in which you equally share [...] The political theory of legitimacy imposes conditions under which a government that interferes in people’s lives need not actually dominate them. Interference is not dominating if it is subject to the control of the interferee. The sort of interference that government inevitably practices in people’s lives will not be dominating, then, if it is subject to the control of its citizens. And that is so, even though the control is shared. Assuming no one is special — this is a basic normative constraint — no one can complain about having to share with others in exercising this control” (Pettit 2015b: 8).

If there is a human right to freedom, and freedom is conceived as non-domination, then there is, arguably, a human right to democracy.⁸

It is now crucial to address the question of whether freedom is really best conceived as non-domination, given that the argument exposed above stands or falls together with that premise.⁹ The conception of freedom as non-domination is based on the view that the mere existence of domination makes a person unfree. Indeed, when a person is dominated (either horizontally in private relations or vertically by public powers), she is not free to make her choices. That means that she cannot exercise her preferences with the level of equality necessary for freedom. This is why Pettit thinks that freedom is to be understood as non-domination. Now, to achieve freedom (that is, in order to prevent domination), Pettit proposes adopting an institutional design with these two fundamental features: the possibility of people to a) shape and reshape the order of their political community and b) exercise contestability. Both

8. This reasoning also excludes the distinction between liberal democracies and decent societies, which was made by Rawls (1971, 1993 and 1999) and is followed by Beitz (2000).

9. There are other conceptions of freedom developed by Hobbes (1994), Mill (1966), Berlin (1969), and Rawls (1971), to name but a few. The conception of freedom constructed by Pettit is distanced from the liberal understanding of freedom as non-interference, which was introduced in 18th century by Bentham (1843) and Paley (2002). Freedom as non-domination differs from freedom as non-interference in two crucial ways: "First, it undermines the 'interference-only' thesis: not only interference but the threat or possibility of it, reduces freedom. I am unfree if I am subjected to an agent that operates like a master, even if the latter does not actually interfere with my actions. Second, freedom as non-domination undermines the 'interference-always' thesis. Interference per se does not reduce freedom; only alien or arbitrary interference does. I am not unfree if I am constrained by a system of laws designed with appropriate checks and controls. What follows is a brief overview of the debates about whether each position is (i) distinctive of republicanism and (ii) compatible with liberalism." (Laborde 2013: 520-521).

of these features are characteristic of democracy. Therefore, there is a human right to democracy, because there is a human right to freedom and democracy is the only way to ensure freedom. I will return to Pettit's argument in section 3, but now turn to Christiano's explicit argument in favour of there being a human right to democracy.

With a clearer and more powerful argument, Christiano (2011) conceives of the human right to democracy as a human right to a minimally egalitarian democracy. To support his point, Christiano (2008, 2011 and 2013) assumes that (1) democracies are normally reliable protectors of certain very urgent and widely accepted human rights, which he identifies with the human rights to personal integrity,¹⁰ whereas (2) non-democracies and partial democracies fail to protect those rights. So, a human right to democracy is grounded in democracy's central role in protecting other fundamental rights in political — local and international — societies. Consequently, he argues, democracies “are necessary and reliable in protecting the human rights to personal integrity” (Christiano 2011: 175). This conclusion offers a moral justification for the international community to protect and promote democracies as a plausible indirect strategy for the protection of the human rights to personal integrity (Christiano 2011: 161 and 165).

Both of these ways of recognising a human right to democracy lead one straightforwardly to the conclusion that issues of political legitimacy justify international interventions. I will not here enter the discussion about whether there is a human right to democracy or not. Suffice it to say that some republican arguments speak in its favour. Now, even if one thinks that no such right exists, she has to take into account political legitimacy when looking for a justification of

10. Christiano (2011: 145) understands by human rights to personal integrity the right not to be tortured, the right not to be arbitrarily imprisoned, and the rights not to be murdered or kidnapped by the state.

international interventions, given that political legitimacy is a necessary condition for the realisation and protection of some human rights — or so I will argue in the next two sections, where I continue to assume that human rights violations are the most common, and almost indisputable, denominator of any attempt to justify international interventions.

III. Human Rights as a Condition of Political Legitimacy

Human rights are usually explored in terms of some criterion of social justice, predicating social justice as some state of affairs, some criteria about the distribution of resources, or even some criterion of corrective justice. Here, by contrast, human rights are explored in terms of some criterion of political legitimacy. In particular, I propose to use the ideas the republican theory provides for this purpose. As anticipated above, I am going to argue that human rights cannot be effectively enjoyed and protected if one is agnostic about the political legitimacy of the state or region in crisis, even if political legitimacy itself is not understood as a human right. This implies that the search for a justification of international interventions needs to change focus from social justice to political legitimacy.

I should also specify why it is necessary to connect human rights and political legitimacy, even if one believes that there is no such thing as a human right to democracy. The answer is simple: a person is only free in a political community that protects her freedoms, among which there are certain human rights, and a political community that protects freedoms is a legitimate one.¹¹

11. Pettit believes that only a free state can respect and promote human rights. However, I believe that the reliance on the state to avoid domination is problematic because it does not cover all the possibilities of domination produced in the global realm.

This change of focus from social justice to political legitimacy leads to the conclusion that international interventions must be used to protect democratic human rights. This obligation arises from the following schematization of the relations between political legitimacy, democracy, and human rights: Political legitimacy depends on the absence of domination. Both democracy and the respect for human rights are necessary for a citizen not to be dominated. Therefore, democracy and human rights operate as necessary conditions of political legitimacy. Since democracy is a necessary condition of non-domination, we have reasons to accept international interventions that promote democracy.

The analysis of human rights in terms of political legitimacy proceeds along these lines: A regime is politically legitimate if, and only if, it shields the individuals from domination in both public and private relations. Public (or vertical) domination is effectively precluded only if the individuals are granted democratic human rights, that is, only if they have an equal say regarding the contents of the laws and norms of their community, as well as in the triggering of the mechanisms of control and contestation. Private (or horizontal) domination, on the other hand, is necessarily precluded only in the absence of public (or vertical) domination. This is so because private domination is a function of social (in)justice which, in turn, depends on the contents of the laws and norms that protect the socioeconomic rights of the individuals of the community.

Given the republican conception of social justice (Pettit 2012: 24-25 and 2014), the contents of the laws and norms established through democratic procedures are, by definition, socially just, whereas the contents of other laws and norms may be socially just or unjust. This means that a democratic political regime necessarily shields individuals from private (or horizontal) domination, whereas a non-democratic political regime may or may not have the same effect. In other words, the absence of public (or vertical) domination precludes the possibility of private (or horizontal) domination. I pointed

out before that human rights and political legitimacy are connected by a simple link — that a person is only free in a political community that protects her freedoms — and the political community that protects freedoms is a legitimate one. The place of human rights in the republican theory reflects the idea that the status of a human being as a free person depends on the power relations considered by the absence of public and private domination. In other words, the republican theoretical ground focuses on the institutional protection of human rights.

A politically legitimate regime shields individuals from public domination directly and from private domination indirectly. A regime is politically legitimate if, and only if, it is democratic. On the one hand, democracy protects individuals from public domination by giving them a) ultimate control over government interference and b) contestatory power. On the other hand, democracy also protects individuals from private domination by placing B's power of interference in the matters of A under government control (Martí and Seleme 2015: 28).

Even those who do not share this view, however, have reason to conclude, as I purport to show in the next section, that issues of political legitimacy justify international intervention.

IV. Prioritizing Political Legitimacy Over Social Justice

This section offers the most radical argument in favour of the view I am defending: that we cannot effectively protect human rights if we remain agnostic as to the political legitimacy of the regimes in the affected states or regions. The argument suggests that a grave deficit of political legitimacy justifies international intervention even in the absence of current violations of human rights. I intend to show that this is true due to the conceptual and normative priority that political legitimacy has over social justice. In this aim, I will first present Pettit's normative argument in favour of

recognizing the priority of political legitimacy. I then put it in a more rigorous logical form to show that international protection must focus on ensuring human rights with respect to democracy.

As we will see, Pettit explains that justice and legitimacy are two branches of political philosophy (Pettit 2012: 24-25; 2014: Ch. 4 and 5). However, since his book *On the People's Terms*, Pettit has been developing a theory of political legitimacy in which legitimacy is given a logical and normative preeminence over social justice. That means that if a state exercises public — or vertical¹² — domination and is therefore illegitimate, this will necessarily show in terms of justice as well (Pettit 2012: 24-25).

Pettit's argument has the following logical form:

Definitions:

Fully robust legitimacy = FRL

Fully robust justice = FRJ

Any shortfall in political legitimacy reduces the degree of robustness with which you enjoy social justice, (1):

(1) not-FRL \rightarrow not-FRJ

Not every shortfall in social justice reduces the degree of robustness with which one enjoys political legitimacy, (2):

12. Pettit (2015b: 85) points out that *legitimacy* is “equivalent to the absence of public or vertical domination, requiring you to share in equal control of the interference that government inevitably practices in your life”. *Justice*, on the other hand, is “equivalent to the absence of private or horizontal domination, requiring you to be more or less proof against the interference of others in suitable choices: you should enjoy their non-interference robustly over whether or not they have a will or a wish to interfere.”

- (2) It is not the case that (not-FRJ \rightarrow not-FRL)
not- (not-FRJ \rightarrow not-FRL)
- (3) Therefore, political legitimacy has normative and logical priority over social justice.

The priority of political legitimacy over social justice implies that if people live in an illegitimate state it entails that there will also be failures in terms of social justice. Pettit explains that “where a lack of social justice alone would make us vulnerable only to our fellow citizens, a lack of political legitimacy would make us vulnerable on two fronts[.] The reason is easy to see. If we are subject to a government that can dominate us, as in an illegitimate regime, then we are going to lack control over changes in that government’s will towards us and towards those of our kind. But this lack of political control means that any social controls we enjoy over changes in the will of our fellow citizens towards us are also likely to be somewhat precarious. While the law may put social controls in place, guarding us against private domination, those safeguards will only be as reliable as the will of the government that establishes and maintains them. Let legitimacy fail [...] and we will be vulnerable both in relation to the state and in relation to our fellow citizens” (Pettit 2012: 24).

In other words, if one is the subject of vertical domination, one cannot be fully free in their private capacity (horizontal domination): “[T]he fact that the government has dominating power in the lives of citizens means that should those in government form a wish or a will to withdraw legal protection from you, or indeed from citizens more generally, then you would again be exposed to private interference” (Pettit 2015a: 85).

Now, even though government bears primary responsibility for protecting human rights, the laws of an illegitimate government, including those that protect against social injustices (i.e. private domination), do not yet ensure with full

robustness that you are free from the interference of others. So, even though political legitimacy has normative priority over social justice, this does not mean that empirically social justice is unneeded. Pettit (2012: 131), for example, argues that empirically, a minimum of social justice is necessary for political legitimacy. In my argument, this minimum could be guaranteed through human rights, which can be understood as protecting people against poverty.

The priority of political legitimacy over social justice also entails that international protection must focus on ensuring human rights with respect to democracy. This does not eliminate the care for human rights in relation to justice. Even if we all agreed on justice, we would still not be indifferent to who makes public decisions and how.

Therefore, given the priority of legitimacy over justice, human rights are fundamental in relation to democracy. It follows from this assertion that the violation of human rights justifies the interventions and/or international protections that limit state sovereignty inasmuch as they can establish the respect for human rights (including the human right to democracy for those who believe that it exists) as a necessary condition of legitimacy. As a consequence, international protection must:

- (1) focus on how to ensure human rights with respect to democracy;
- (2) give priority to those human rights which are intrinsically connected with democracy; and
- (3) ensure that their use effectively leads to democracy.

V. Conclusions

At this point one can ask how republican political theory contributes to the protection of those human rights which are related with democracy and how this is connected with the justification of international intervention. I mentioned

in sections 2 and 3 that republicans have defended the ideal of freedom as non-domination, where the existence of domination makes a person unfree, and that the relationship between republicanism and human rights is evidenced in the conception of domination. When a person is dominated, she is unfree; she cannot choose freely. Instead of freedom, her preferences are not taken into account, which goes against the basic level of equality necessary for freedom. This last element — equality — has particular importance for a political community and constructs political legitimacy (Olsson 2015).

Pettit's description of how freedom as non-domination operates presents a framework for human rights and its realization. This is because, for the republican, only institutionalization can guarantee human rights against arbitrary exercise of power. According to the republican ideal, a well-ordered political community creates the conditions for a non-dominating political authority. Under this premise, non-domination can secure human rights when people are able to not only shape and reshape its institutions, but also to contest them.

Different positions arise regarding the question of how to institutionalize those rights. For Pettit, a theory of human rights must protect the individual by locating the power relation between the individual and the state. For other republicans, like Bohman (2010a) or Martí (2010), power relations go beyond the state. Bohman proposed reinforcing Pettit's initial idea by expanding freedom as non-domination through a cosmopolitan account to the global sphere. He added that "...under conditions of globalization freedom from tyranny and domination cannot be achieved without extending our political ideals of democracy, community and membership" (Bohman 2004: 352). He placed a framework for human rights between what he calls a "republican account of universal political rights to membership" and the "democratic minimum" (Bohman 2010b: 94). On his account, the realization of human rights requires a democratic framework because "it is only as a citizen within the normative framework of a

democracy that self-origination is made actual as the capacity to begin to initiate meaningful activity”. Bohman refers to “self-origination” as something like a minimal sense of self-governance that could be realized in a range of different ways. Freedom as non-domination is the most fundamental political human right, and in the absence of a democracy, one lacks the ability to “lay claim to the status of free equal person in particular social relationships of power” (Bohman 2005: 104).

Bohman’s account entails the obligation to create institutions on the global level that address legal claims and have the capacity to enforce universal rights of membership on a framework constituted by legitimate and democratically accountable institutions (Bohman 2004). That said, I will transpose the republican argument onto the global realm and illustrate the kind of intervention that could be justified and explain what the priority of democracy over justice means. To do so, I will introduce two hypothetical situations. The first serves to illustrate our concern for political legitimacy as well as for social justice. The second serves to illustrate the priority of political legitimacy over social justice.

To start with the first example, think about a state — State A —, which has a regime respecting the rule of law and some human rights (for example, it does not torture people), but its government is illegitimate. Is international intervention justified because the government is illegitimate? We will see that such an intervention is a relevant and disputable matter.

I think that the intervention is legitimate, and by saying that I am not denying that it is also justified in cases where there is a lack of justice. What I am saying is that the pursuit of legitimacy (that is, democracy) must have a certain priority over the pursuit of justice. One possible example illustrating the point was Hong Kong’s so-called “Umbrella Revolution”.¹³

13. “Tens of thousands of Hong Kong residents – young and old, rich and poor – have peacefully occupied major thoroughfares across the city,

It is important to note here that I am not referring to international interventions as equivalent to humanitarian interventions. The kind of international intervention I am thinking of relates to international financial support, models of transitional justice and, more directly, ways of supporting democracy. We can find some examples in the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union (EU) by the Council of Europe (CE).¹⁴ Through these policies the EU aims to promote and support the rule of law in countries — Tunisia is one of them — that are converting from a transitional to consolidated democracy.¹⁵

The second example concerns a state — call it State B — that does not respect any criteria of political legitimacy or social justice. In this hypothetical example, State B has no respect for the rule of law, human rights, or democratic rules. In this case, international intervention is also fully justified. Although it is justified on partially different grounds. I would say, again, that certain priority must be given here to the efforts that effectively lead to democracy.

Moreover, in both examples, international intervention must focus on the question of how to ensure human rights with respect to democracy, thus a) giving priority to those human rights which are intrinsically connected with democracy — such as the rights to free expression, political organization, opposition, and free and fair elections, among others — and b) ensuring that their use effectively leads to democracy.

In the second type of case, reactions from the international

shuttering businesses and bringing traffic to a halt. They claim that Beijing renege on an agreement to grant them open elections by 2017, and demand ‘true universal suffrage’”. See Jonathan Kaiman, Hong Kong’s umbrella revolution, *The Guardian*, September 30, 2014.

14. The European Neighbourhood Policy is a space where the EU as an external actor might exert some influence in domestic processes of democratization.

15. See, Magen and Morlino (eds.) 2008.

community can be implemented through, as I mentioned before, international financial support, models of transitional justice and, more directly, ways to support democracy. They can also be implemented through three different types of measures: (a) encouraging measures (for example by supporting those who advocate for democracy), (b) sanctions (that is, condemnation, breach of relations, non-recognition of governments, sanctions decided by international organizations, and recourse to the Security Council for enforcing sanctions) and countermeasures, and (c), in exceptional cases (such as in the case of Haiti), the use of force, where the recent practice of the Security Council shows that a *coup d'état* can represent a threat to peace.¹⁶

If this argument is connected with the idea of a human right to democracy, then a determinant reason supporting an intervention from the international community would be that it can guarantee the development of democratic conditions or the establishment of a democratic regime. One piece of evidence for this possibility consists in Resolution S/RES/2012/2048 (2012) of the UN Security Council and its Declaration S/PRST/2012/15 (2012) condemning the military coup in Guinea-Bissau of 12 April 2012, which undermined the conclusion of the democratic electoral process. Another piece of evidence of the same sort comes from a more recent UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/2337 (2017), referring to a situation in Gambia. In these documents, the Security Council seems to have accepted the imposition of measures in order to protect democracy. But that is not all. If the international community continues to guarantee the development of democratic conditions or the establishment of a democratic regime through its institutions, and if these international

16. See for example United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/940: "Reaffirming that the goal of the international community remains the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, within the framework of the Governors Island Agreement".

institutions accumulate more and more power, then another crucial question will beg for an answer: how to assure the political legitimacy of international institutions?

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