An objection to Garreta Leclercq’s “Democracy and Deliberation: Two Models of Public Justification”
Palabras clave:public justification, standard conception of justification, common ground conception of justification, democracy, public debate
In “Democracy and Deliberation: Two Models of Public Justification”, Mariano Garreta Leclercq presents an interesting argument in favor of what he calls “the common ground” conception of justification, as against the “standard” conception of justification. In this note I present an objection to that argument. More precisely, I point out a tension between two statements of that argument: 1) There is no right to decide for others; and 2) the margin of error in moral issues is very considerable. I say that, if we are committed to the statement that the margin of error is very considerable in moral issues, so we cannot be convinced that there is no right to decide for others, because it is a moral principle in itself.