Max Weber is a seminal figure in the humanities and social sciences, whose ideas retain a profound and enduring impact across various disciplines, notably philosophy, history, sociology, economics, and law. His perspectives on political party systems and bureaucratic structures are pivotal in the discourse on contemporary state systems, particularly in the analysis of power configurations within political philosophy. Weber's stance on these systems and their interplay offers valuable insights for our inquiry; however, scholars may have inadvertently neglected the elitism tendency inherent in his position.
Weber's conceptual framework regarding ideology can be juxtaposed with structuralism's focus on relational dynamics, particularly in examining the nexus between political parties and bureaucratic systems through the lens of elitism. This article seeks to reevaluate Weber's elitist inclinations and, from this vantage point, delineate his views on the interplay among bureaucracy, party systems, and elitist ideologies. Subsequent sections will dissect and scrutinize Weber's positions on these political structures. These analyses are grounded in a thorough review of pertinent literature, aiming to achieve a comprehensive and profound grasp of the psychological substratum and semantic elements within Weber's discourse, which holds intrinsic scholarly value.
The focus of this article is that Weber's discourse on party and bureaucratic systems contains a tendency towards elitism. The rationale for selecting this topic for scholarly inquiry is twofold: firstly, compared to the overt elitism of other ideologues such as Alexander Hamilton, Edmund Burke and Robert Michels, Weber's elitist proclivity is more subtle; [A1.1][A1.2]secondly, the dearth of innovative research, particularly the absence of novel methodological approaches, has led to a plateau in scholarly progress, necessitating a fresh examination of Weber's conceptual contributions.
This article posits that an investigation into the amalgamation of power structures with the historical trajectory of political philosophy is inherently valuable. Such a study compels a reappraisal of the political party system, bureaucratic system, and the elitism hidden within it. It also elicits pertinent political philosophical queries: Does the elite's dominance in political decision-making under these systems curtail citizen engagement? What are the repercussions of elite hegemony on these systems within the model of political participation? How do structural systems function within a democratic framework? What political and non-political ramifications, particularly concerning social resource distribution, reinforcement of social power hierarchies, and issues of inequality, do these impacts engender? These ostensibly abstract considerations carry profound practical implications, especially amidst the current populist surge epitomized by the "Trump phenomenon," [A2.1][A2.2]which is exacerbating the global democratic crisis. For the historiography of political philosophy, this research offers a refreshed interpretation of Weber's ideas, particularly in light of contemporary debates regarding the alignment of his academic and political inclinations with British political tradition, corporatism, and social liberalism. (Mommsen 1974, 25; Mizman 1973, 108-112)
What needs to be added here are the definitions of two terms that are prone to ambiguity in this article. "Elitism" is understood as the view that the decision - making and management of society should be dominated by elites (Habibi, 2024). In contrast, "populism" is described as the position that emphasizes the will and interests of the common people should take precedence over the stance and decision - making process of traditional political elites (Jansma, 2019).
According to Weber, the political party system is fundamentally a societal construct, an organization representing various groups and interests vying for bureaucratic roles. (Weber 1988; Weber 1980, 837)[A3.1][A3.2] Society in this context is to be interpreted as collective action oriented towards a shared goal, with the political leadership of parties driven by interests therein. Within Weber's sociological framework, interests are bifurcated into "material interests - goal-directed actions" (materialiellen Interessen - zielgerichtete Handlungen) and "ideological interests - value-oriented actions" (ideologischen Interessen - wertbeladenen Handlungen). [A4.1][A4.2]The behavior that defines the purpose of a political party is unequivocally of the former category. In addtion, Weber endorsed the rationality of the political party system, viewing the advent of party machinery as synonymous with the emergence of citizen voting democracy, necessitating immediate public acknowledgment. (Weber 1988) This affirmative stance also suggests that a political party system is indispensable to a democratic framework.
Weber also delved into the bureaucratic system, specifically the modern civil service. He characterized the bureaucratic system as an ideal type within the economy and society, occupying a dominant position in the leadership structure of social units. (Weber 2007) Civil servants, in his view, are characterized by their legal authority, administrative documentation, document-based workflow, and professional knowledge supported by personnel secretarial departments - objective criteria essential for the professionalization of the civil service. (Weber 2007; Weber 1980, 128) Weber highlighted that the distinctions between modern civil service systems and classical bureaucracies stem from the evolution of social conditions. He (1980, 551-580) identified these conditions as encompassing the prerequisites of a monetary economy and finance, the expansion and enhancement of administrative tasks, the technological superiority of bureaucratic organizations, the concentration of administrative resources, and the orderly flattening of economic and social structures. In essence, Weber's conception of the bureaucratic system is the interplay of internal bureaucratic professions and external social conditions. In his sociology, these factors signify rational and organized communal conduct, governing the structure that translates political issues into administrative challenges. (Weber 1980, 823; Bendix 1978, 438-439)
Drawing from the preceding account, Weber delineates bureaucracy as an organizational method governed by rational rules and procedures, founded on specialization, division of labor, and hierarchical structures, and oriented towards achieving objectives through standardized, stable, and predictable conduct. This organizational form can also be perceived as a permanent political entity comprising professional politicians, predicated on the dynamics of governance institutions. As a important community component, the governing body necessitates the backing of administrative staff and material administrative resources. (Weber 1980, 542-544; Weber 1988) The administrative staff are distinguished by their honor and socialization, an outgrowth of modern state bureaucracy and a consequence of specialized and internal knowledge. (Weber 1988; Weber 2017, 675) Furthermore, substantive administrative documents are the progeny of the historical confiscation and monopolization of administrative documents by modern state systems - a process that has perennially been enveloped in secrecy, given that the bureaucratic stratum is inherently a matter of power interests. (Weber 1988; Weber 1980, 71)
Weber scrutinized the merits and demerits of bureaucracy, noting that it can ensure the stability and efficiency of administrative bodies by making decisions through established rules and procedures, thereby mitigating the impact of subjectivity and personal biases. Additionally, bureaucratic institutions are capable of delivering equitable and just services, curbing the potential for power abuse and corruption. In Weber's perspective, the hierarchical formalism, vocational training, and cultivation of an altruistic ethos within the bureaucratic system epitomize the rationality inherent in modern society itself. (Weber 1980, 128-129) He also identified the drawbacks of bureaucracy, suggesting that its excessive standardization and inflexibility could result in sluggish responsiveness and a diminished capacity for innovation. Furthermore, the persistence of bureaucracy and formalism may engender bloated and inefficient administrative structures.
Weber's comprehension of authority, domination, and power prompts him to focus intently on the development of bureaucratic systems. He (1980, 542) posits that the bureaucratic system exemplifies the absolute exercise of power as a form of professional authority. This scrutiny is, in essence, a typical illustration of his perspective on bureaucracy as a contemporary power structure and the operational mechanism it engenders.
Furthermore, Weber's political philosophy appears to harbor an underlying elitist propensity. His discourse on the acquisition of power by professional expertise within the bureaucratic system suggests that the attributes and competencies of the "Leadership Politics" (Politische Führung) (Gast, 2009)[A5.1][A5.2] confer upon them certain privileges and a preeminent societal status - a form of authority derived from formal rationalization that aligns with the preconditions for elitism's emergence.
The concept of the state serves as a nexus between Weber's perspectives on political parties and bureaucratic systems. The political party system represents the manifestation of political power at the national level, while the bureaucratic system constitutes a vital element of the state's power architecture. Weber (1988, 198) defines the state as a social entity that possesses a legitimate monopoly on the use of force within a defined territory, existing through the obedience to the authority of the ruling power. He was also swayed by Ernst Troeltsch's view that the state is a superordinate power detached from the popular spirit, with social and political justice being integral to the sustenance of the nation-state. (Ringer 1969, 100-101; Wenck 1905, 63) Consequently, the bureaucratic system underscores a significant aspect of the development of a rational and legitimate power structure within the state, and political parties act as intermediaries between individuals and the nation-state, particularly within the bureaucratic system.
In the realm of practical politics, the government presents itself as a more concrete entity than the abstract concept of the state. Utilizing Weber's tripartite classification encompassing social class, non-economic factors, and party relations, the bureaucratic system is seen as part of the second category, and the party system as part of the third, appearing to be discrete entities. However, a reexamination through Weber's sociological perspective uncovers a governmental connection between them. Weber defined sociology as "a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action to ascertain causal relationships within its processes and outcomes" (Weber 2007). From this viewpoint, Weber's typology of sociological behavior identifies determinants that allow for the exploration of linkages between these two systems within his theoretical framework through specific social behaviors. Furthermore, Weber asserted that legitimate order in action depends on an organizational structure sustained by the legitimate exercise of power, with democratic systems being recognized as a form of legitimate order capable of regulating human conduct. (Bendix 1978, 477-478; Alexander 2012, 153). Thus, the activities of political parties and bureaucratic institutions revolve around the government's legitimate order, where parties influence governmental power and decision-making through elections and discussions, while bureaucrats implement and execute these decisions following rules and procedures. An additional insight is that, from the perspective of governmental power and decision-making, there is indeed an upstream-downstream relationship between political parties and bureaucratic institutions within the governmental decision-making process.
The internal structures of political party and bureaucratic systems are fundamentally identical, adhering to a hierarchical framework for policy formulation and resource allocation. As political entities, both are guided by the elemental definition of politics, which is the pursuit of power. (Weber 1988, 197; Weber 1980, 172) Here, power is understood in a neo-Kantism sense, relating to the division and distribution within social relations where actors preclude the possibility of resistance to the execution of will. Thus, it can be posited that both the political party system and bureaucratic system are reliant on the authority of their leadership from an internal structural perspective, thereby reflecting power inequalities. The high degree of similarity between these operational models and organizational architectures arises from analogous evolutionary trajectories, as well as the organizations' quest for stability and efficiency through standardization and proceduralization. This paradigm exemplifies the power dynamics and control mechanisms of modern society and serves as the interlinking medium between the political party system and the bureaucratic system.
Weber's sociological inquiries were, in essence, centered on the mind[A6.1][A6.2], - meaning they were concerned with the cognitive aspects of human behavior and thought patterns - leading to the coinage of proprietary terms such as "de-magification,"[A7.1][A7.2] (Entzauberung) "Intelligence," (Intellektualisierung) and "Rationalization" (Rationalisierung) to further research objectives. (Kolko 1959; Gu 2004, 132) Employing Weber's depiction of the spirit of modern society as a benchmark for emphasizing social rationality allows us to comprehend the distinct interplays between the political party system and the bureaucratic system. Weber segmented social life into three dimensions: authority, material interests, and value orientation. (Bendix 1978, 286) These dimensions, which are the cornerstones of social structure, are all predicated on the rationality inherent in modern society and are synthesized herein. Rationality[A8.1][A8.2] is manifested in 'legal authority' (gesetzliche Herrschaft), distinct from 'Traditional authority' (traditionale Herrschaft) and 'charismatic authority' (charismatische Herrschaft). (Weber 1980, 142) In this context, it's important to note that traditional authority may rely more on substantive rationality due to its basis in established values and customs, while legal - rational authority emphasizes formal rationality as it depends on law - making and enforcement. The nomenclature itself indicates that these terms stem from Weber's categorization of authority and power, suggesting that the essence of reason is encapsulated in legal authority. In the metamorphosis of modern society, namely the instrumental contestation of traditional governance and its evolution into a legitimate rational form, both the political party system and the bureaucratic system exemplify legal power: the political party system is an organization that engages in the competition and participation within the legal framework, while the bureaucratic system is one that enforces it. (Alexander 2012, 122; Bendix 1978, 386) This aligns with the previously mentioned upstream and downstream relationship between the two within the government and also pertains to an understanding of legal power. The spiritual essence of legal power is its legal rationality, with an emphasis on formal and material rationality, particularly concerning formal norms related to the distribution of certain interests. (Alexander 2012, 153,154) Consequently, in Weber's research, the distribution of benefits is often linked to self-regulation and value interpretation, especially in the context of public service ethics.
The "morality" previously discussed extends to Weber's examination of the political ethics within party and bureaucratic systems. In Weber's ethical framework, ethical conduct is contingent upon either a commitment to character ethics or a dedication to responsibility ethics. (Weber 2017, 783) Accordingly, political party systems and bureaucratic systems each possess an internal ethical compass to navigate specific political actions. Weber (2017, 672) termed this "disposition ethics" (Verfügungsethik), positing that it serves to effectively circumscribe power. This brand of political ethics, designed to curtail power, is fundamentally about modulating the distribution of interests - aligning with the ultimate purpose of establishing bureaucratic systems.
The preceding section examined the relationship between the political party system and the bureaucratic system in Weber's political philosophy, which are principal manifestations of modern society, and posited that they often orbit around concepts such as the state, power, and governance. In reality, the interconnections of these concepts also mask potential elitist inclinations: given the upstream and downstream dynamic between political party systems and bureaucratic systems within state and more specifically, government decision-making processes, and considering that both systems are controlled by elites, the decision-making process, including rationality and the negotiation and implementation of power generation, is inevitably dominated by these elites. Specifically, the political party system and bureaucratic system secure their advantages in power and resource distribution by ensuring the elites' dominant position as authorities or leaders in absolute power and decision-making. This elitist phenomenon is rationalized within modern society and has become institutionalized: as a governing principle of modern society and a form of power, elites, as legal authorities, rationalize the establishment of these two institutional systems and the nature of public engagement through the broad application of law.
In Weber's political philosophy, the elitist tendency encompasses more than just the institutionalization of elitism previously discussed. Weber's emphasis lies more on the dominant structure rather than the legitimacy of its essence - loyalty to this structure and its leaders is merely a functional aspect. (Alexander 2012, 75) Within the political party system, the power of parties is often controlled and exercised by a minority of elites, and can inevitably become an instrument of the party's elite, namely politicians - the instrumentalization of which arises from politicians' control over the party as leaders based on their political experience, resources, and influence, particularly in setting the party's direction and policies. The bureaucratic system, as previously noted, also operates on the directives of leaders as the foundation for organizing actions. Concurrently, these bureaucrats require substantial professional knowledge and administrative skills to meet the efficiency demands of institutional management and operation: under the basic premise of governance, which entails a certain level of efficiency, both the political party system and the bureaucratic system self-optimize in pursuit of stability and efficiency, aiming to maximize interests. This optimization is often predicated on the requirements of its members and their expertise in public governance, implying a certain threshold of professional knowledge, also referred to as the "elite threshold".
The elitism hidden in Weber's stance on party and bureaucratic systems mentioned in the previous section actually raises a question: is the elitism contained in Weber's ideal party and bureaucratic systems reasonable? Even the legal rules epitomized by this elitism have been codified. Additionally, Weber's portrayal of modern rational society (also termed nation-states) only suggests oligarchic centralization and its potential repercussions from an elitist standpoint - inherent in political parties and bureaucratic systems - while Weber's ideology, whether it pertains to the British political tradition, corporatism, or social liberalism, is rather sanguine about society's future trajectory. Hence, does a contradiction exist between two divergent discourses on the future society within the same individual's ideology? More broadly, is Weber's covert elitist inclination in party and bureaucratic systems reconcilable with his other intellectual propositions?
The first question is inherently a matter of political philosophy. A pivotal insight is Weber's conception of the modern rational state, where "citizenship identity - personal identity," "national interest - local interest," and "universal law - special law" coexist. (Bendix 1978, 439) As Ringer (1977, 34) notes, this perspective is emblematic of German classical sociology and a byproduct of moderate modernism. Another classical sociologist influenced by moderate modernism, Tönnies (1979, 208-209), posited that economic rationality disrupted traditional communities, giving rise to modern society. Weber (1980, 31-32) also alluded to economic rationality, characterizing it as instrumental rationality akin to economic calculations. Within Weber's framework, the depersonalization of party and bureaucratic systems underscores this instrumental rationality, endeavoring to quantify everything and resolve all issues based on it. Thus, the question of the rationality of elitist tendencies within political party systems and bureaucratic systems is fundamentally an exploration of the extreme ramifications of economic rationality. Here, extreme issues can be interpreted as pragmatic strategies pursued by political and bureaucratic systems for stability and efficiency, inevitably leading to depersonalized extremes - such as the emergence of "orderly individuals" (Ordnungsmenschen), who are casualties of excessive bureaucratization.
Marcuse (1968, 202), Bendix (1978, 45-55), and Habermas (1981, 256), in their critical analyses of Weber, ascribe the disregard for the legitimacy of two unchecked instrumental rationality systems to a defense of capitalism - Weber defined the "spirit of capitalism" (Geist des Kapitalismus) as a rationality pursuing economic interests, yet overlooked that it is but a facet of rationality itself. This critique overlooks a significant theme: Weber's own contributions to modern social issues, especially the issue of modernity - his genuine comprehension of the underlying mechanisms of modern social operation and various reflections on modern society, particularly the deepest hidden flaws. The party system and bureaucratic system, alienated by instrumental rationality, risk becoming tools akin to oligarchic systems to entrench their power, leading to diminished public political engagement and severe social stratification issues. This perspective corresponds with a theme in Weber's discourse, leading to the emergence of small groups or conspiracies reminiscent of Caesar's, resulting in the ideal leader in modern society being a charismatic leader rather than a legal one. (Weber 2017, 672; Loewenstein 1966) Furthermore, the elite conspiracies within these small groups may precipitate issues within the political party system and bureaucratic system. For instance, For instance, Bendix (1978, 351-352) posits that "negative politics" (negativer Politik) refers to the bureaucratic system's use of knowledge and secrecy due to a lack of external oversight, which endangers the rule of law, corrupts politics, and may lead to bureaucratic dictatorship. From this perspective, the elitism implicit in Weber's positions on party and bureaucratic systems appears detrimental to democratic principles and political transparency - and thus, its existence is deemed unreasonable from the standpoint of a democratic society that values accountability and citizen participation[A9.1][A9.2].
From an alternative vantage point, Weber's stance on the elitism embedded within party and bureaucratic systems possesses a certain rationality. On one hand, should the political party system and bureaucratic system entirely forsake elitism, the entire democratic system could be susceptible to hijacking by extreme populist mob policies, potentially leading to de facto anarchy, with the French Revolution being the most emblematic historical event. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, 153-154) and Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2019, 6) propose a second possibility: because populism is more akin to a political strategy, it employs charismatic leaders to wield government power with direct, non-institutionalized support from followers. In this scenario, political support is prone to exploitation by ambitious individuals, becoming a hotbed for totalitarianism or authoritarianism, which is detrimental to democratic systems as populist leaders seldom emerge from the populace and resist diversity - the cornerstone of democracy. (François 2018) The third possibility is the "tyranny of the majority," a concept frequently discussed by Mill and Tocqueville. Within populist discourse, elites are pitted against the people, with the will of the people seen as the foundation of any good policy. (Ben 2008; Mudde 2004) On the other hand, under the binary narrative of populism, popular emotional politics may devolve into different forms of governance focused on the wrong issues, leading to anti-intellectual tragedies such as Socrates' demise, which will undoubtedly persecute societal members. Thus, within traditional political parties and bureaucratic systems, elites are actually an umbrella term for various groups, obscuring the distinctions among elites and potential conflicts of interest between these systems - manifested by potential conflicts of interest between politicians elected by political parties and officials who enter through examinations or other avenues. Politicians elected by political parties tend to make more radical decisions based on voting considerations, while bureaucrats, driven by bureaucratic inertia, adopt conservative strategies to implement leaders' decisions. Therefore, elitism within the political party system and bureaucratic system retains a degree of rationality. However, as per the previous discussion, this rationality is not unassailable, and there remains significant scope for improvement.
The second question necessitates a return to Weber's research characteristics, employing them to assess potential conflicts between his various insights. Schwinn (2014, 349) segments Weber's scholarship into three realms: theoretical, methodological, and historical analysis. This research, predicated on the paradigm of historical material analysis - that is, theory and methodology - often encounters empirical discordances attributable to subjective and historical material factors. Weber's grasp of experiential conflict led him to eschew normative behavior and functionalist models, which, in turn, bolstered his portrayal of the atomization struggle. (Collins, 1968; Ashcraft, 1972) The atomization struggle is interpreted as the contention individuals face amidst competition and clashing interests in modern society. Consequently, individuals in contemporary society frequently forfeit collective consciousness and solidarity, succumbing to isolation, and such atomized struggles can intensify interest conflicts, potentially culminating in centralization and dire outcomes. A quintessential illustration of this is the aforementioned elitism and its concomitant centralization, which appears to clash with other aspects of Weber's ideology.
We must revisit our understanding of Weber's other ideas, particularly the analysis of his ideological leanings. Weber's adherence to Social liberalism[A10.1][A10.2] can be interpreted as a mitigating strategy for the profit-seeking behaviors of certain elites amidst the struggle for atomization, as well as a response to bureaucratic, centralized decision-making, and the abuse of power by a select few. Citing Peterson (1981) and Besnard (1930), unionism endeavors to supplant political parties and the state with unions, notably in public policy domains. These ideologies appear to circumvent elitist exclusivity within political parties by reconfiguring the decision-making authority over public policies. Moreover, the collectivist emphasis on occupational group autonomy is, in essence, an attempt to erode the power base of elites through the political engagement of the populace, which also constitutes a form of resistance. Most crucially, collectivism can advocate for greater prosperity and rights for the working class, thereby mitigating social inequality stemming from elite centralization. Unlike collectivism, which concentrates on social class and labor relations, liberalism adopts a broader outlook and addresses more universal concerns. Vallentyne (2017) delineates liberalism as a natural ethic that prioritizes freedom as its paramount political value, highlighting individual liberty and the right to curb governmental authority. For instance, liberalism offers a robust framework for elucidating the authority of law and aligning it with effective self-protection to ascertain the legitimacy of administrative processes. (Adamovich and Funk 1987, 7; Nipperdey 1993, 182ff) Significantly, liberalism underscores the principles of individual freedom and equality, positing that these values will alleviate core societal conflicts, which also serves to counteract elite centralization. Thus, from an ideological analysis standpoint, Weber's theories are not inherently contradictory: his somber portrayal of elites and their centralization, along with his depiction of British corporatism and liberalism, are presented within the spectrum of "criticism of reality, envisioning an ideal future society, and addressing practical challenges."
Moreover, Weber's two descriptions come from different levels and backgrounds. These relationships can be elucidated by drawing on examples from other German political philosophers. For instance, Minzel's conception of the "Millennium Kingdom" was a response to the critique of the aristocracy and the church of his era, envisioning this ideal as a societal model for the movement against the nobility and ecclesiastical institutions. Similarly, the ideal of Marxist communism is rooted in the critique of capitalism, positing it as an ideal society that catalyzes the proletarian revolution against capitalism.
An alternative perspective to explore the second question is to consider that the apparent contradictions in Weber's discourse arise from his comprehensive and multifaceted examination of modern rational society, which dissects social phenomena and human behavior. This societal comprehension encompasses a range of interacting and conflicting dynamics, with the intricate interplay among these forces reflected in Weber's discussions. This implies that Weber's divergent assertions are not, in fact, contradictory; and even if contradictions exist, they are inherently congruent with the complexities of society itself - this does not signify a discord within the two narratives within Weber's ideological framework.
The article also highlights the limitations in Weber's discourse, specifically his oversight of the legitimacy of power concentration, and presents the author's fundamental perspective on this issue: while elite power concentration possesses a degree of rationality, it does not constitute an ideal political process or outcome. Furthermore, the article clarifies that Weber's views on this matter are not in contradiction with his broader perspectives, particularly his endorsements of collectivism and liberalism.
As this article elucidates, Weber's contributions extend beyond the mere creation of new paradigms, which are integral to the development of sociological imagination. This involves employing paradigms to analyze all historical data, yielding research outcomes in political philosophy and beyond. The preceding discussion also reveals how Weber's research methodology influences the articulation of his conclusions. Delving deeper into this aspect allows us to grasp Weber's ideological framework, which is both a duty and a mandate of the history of ideas.
Weber's stance offers a critical reflection for today's democratic systems: it necessitates an examination of elitism within current political parties and bureaucratic systems, with an emphasis on three key aspects: the historical acquisition and maintenance of power by elites, the extent of existing centralization, and the resultant damages. Such explorations should yield informed corrective measures. Concurrently, it is imperative to assess the benefits of elitism within these systems to preempt institutional reforms amidst the burgeoning populist tide, thereby averting exacerbation of existing damages.
The core thesis and associated conclusions of this article lay the groundwork for novel research endeavors spanning political philosophy, political practice, and the history of ideas. Subsequent inquiries will uncover fresh perspectives on Weber's concepts and potentially enrich the understanding of German classical political philosophy, unearthing historical intellectual treasures. This implies that these once-considered obsolete theories may acquire renewed significance, with their revitalized value playing a distinctive role in future interpretive and applied contexts, exerting distinct influences on both political philosophy and global situation.
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Fecha de recepción: 20 de noviembre de 2024.
Fecha de aceptación: 15 de junio de 2025.